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A Critical Study 
3y Sulayman S. Nyang 
e encounter between Europe and Africa 
~ave rise to numerous problems for the 
:JeOple of the continent. It exposed their 
:::ultu res and economies to the aggres-
~- ely expanding forces of capitalism and 
=-e attendant racist ideology which ra-
- alized the emerging political and 
aconomic relationships between the peo-
:: es of the Northern Hemisphere and 
~ se of the Southern Hemisphere. Also, it 
.:ooned up a deep psychological and 
::;sycho-cultural wound in the mental es-
-c:e of the African as well as other Third 
rid peoples. This psychological injury, 
~ng with the political subordination that 
-;;suited from the technological superior-
- , of the colonizing forces, combined to 
:reate the Manichean world which Frantz 
=-anon poetically portrayed in Black Skin, 
nite Masks. 
The African's attempt to wiggle out of 
- -s historical position of colonial de-
- dency led to a series of revolts , upris-
~. labor strikes and other minor in-
ces of anomic violence. This drive to 
3;Sert one's pride and dignity before the 
=--ogant imperial powers put the national-
- leaders and the masses on a collision 
rse with the watchdogs of the Euro-
=ean colonial territories in Africa. 
rtegardless of how one may feel about 
<:3 Europe-Africa encounter, the fact re-
ins that the efforts at liberation consti-
- -,, what scholars and political commen-
- rs around the world now call the 
- - -can Revolution. Of course, there are 
erous meanings for the term, but for 
sake of clarity, the African Revolution 
...c..1 be defined as the total efforts of the 
- - - an peoples to liberate themselves 
the yoke of foreign rule and to make 
ry in the capacity of free men who can 
- - par excellence of the African Revolu-
. Fanon was not as prolific as Kwame 
- e become the universal inheritance of 
n civilization. 
n ough numerous books and articles 
been written on the subject, the writ-
ings of Fanon have made him the intellec-
tual par excellence of the African Revolu-
tion. Fanon was not as pro I ific as Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana or Leopold Senghor of 
Senegal , but the limited number of works 
he left behind have conferred upon him 
the mantle of greatness which the other 
two thinkers now enjoy in the Third World 
The reason that Fanon became the darling 
of the Third World radicals was that he 
articulated effectively what most of them 
felt for so long but could not find the 
proper time, place or words to make them 
known to other members of the colonially-
created community of suffering. Added to 
this was the fact that Fanon practicalized 
his politics by joining a revolutionary force 
at the height of its battle against French 
rule in Algeria. 
Scholarly interest in the works of Fanon 
has also been motivated by the unique 
characteristics of this intellectual from 
Martinique. The Fanon legend has not 
only attracted scholars who are trying to 
understand the processes of change in the 
developing countries; it also captured the 
imag ination of those scholars who are in-
terested in groups and identity formation. 
This second group of scholars found that 
the influence of the man from Martinique 
goes beyond the Black World. He has 
been the mentor of Bengal is in their battle 
to create Bangladesh out of Pakistan; he 
is the idol of the nationalists in Ireland, the 
star of the Palestinians and the ideologi-
cal guru of the French Canadians who see 
some similarities between their subordi-
nate role in the Canadian federation and 
that of the colonized as described by 
Fanon. 
As it should be evident by now, Fanon 
was admired largely because of his suc-
cess as a man of action. He was not an in-
te I lectual engaged in the theoretical anal-
ysis of human oppression from the safety 
of his academic ivory tower, but a com-
mitted and sincere activist who derived 
and lived his theories of liberation from 
one of the corners of the battlefield where 
the Algerian revolutionary struggle raged . 
Ironically, a good number of African 
intellectuals are still undecided about 
Fanon's ideas. This fact was noted by 21 
Paul A. Beckett when he asked in a recent 
article whether " in the situation of post-
independence uncertainty Fanon 's 
thought will become more significant in 
West Africa than heretofore." 1 
African intellectuals, whom Fanon often 
attacked in his writings, have not rallied 
enthusiastically around his ideas partly 
because they are not the chosen people 
in the gospel of Fanonian liberation. This 
special role has been assigned to the 
peasantry. In Fanon's view, the intellectual 
class can only contribute to the liberation 
of their colonized people, not only by cut-
ting that umbilical cord that ties them to 
their European fellows in the metropole, 
but also by disassociating themselves 
completely from the politics of collabora-
tion with the imperialist powers. 
Such a task has been deemed difficult 
by some of the African intellectuals. As 
Am ilcar Cabral once stated , these bour-
geoisie must commit class suicide in the 
interest of the revolution if they are to con-
tribute to the liberation and transformation 
of their society. Such a state of mind has 
not been manifested in most, if not all, of 
the newly independent African and Asian 
countries. 
I. Theory of Violence 
Fanon's theory of violence has been one 
key aspect of his political thought that has 
generated a lot of comment. Emmanuel 
Hansen, in an art icle, "Frantz Fanon: A 
Bibliography Essay," listed numerous ar-
ticles that addressed themselves to this 
matter.2 
This part of Fanon's thought cannot be 
properly understood unless and until one 
follows the arguments of Fanon on coloni-
alism and its evils. To Fanon, co lonialism 
did not only give rise to unequal relation-
ship between the colonized and the colo-
nizer, but it also shattered the very psycho-
cultura l and psychohistorical foundations 
of the colonized society. This is to say, ac-
cording to Fanon, the life of the colonized 
in a colonial society was that of a series of 
historical and cultural abuses and hum iii-
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22 ations whose totality constituted the phe-
nomenon of colonial alienation. 
It was Fanon's attempt to deal psycho-
therapeutically with this problem of alien-
ation that led him to the theory of violence. 
Though this theory has been scrutinized, 
distorted, misrepresented and lauded by 
all kinds of reviewers and commentators, 
there is still room for its examination and 
analysis again- just to decide whether 
Fanon is relevant to Africa today. 
Fanon's thesis on violence is based on 
the following premises: (1) that the colo-
nial society is based on force (2) that the 
colonized people are kept on their knees 
because they are terrorized and inferior-
ized into submission (3) that violence is 
the only language comprehensible to the 
colonizers (4) that logic and reason are 
inadequate tools in the fight against colo-
nialism (5) that violence is cathartic and 
self-purifying for the colonized who em-
ploy it against their colonial oppressors. 
Decolonization , Fanon argues, can only 
come about when the co lonized people 
take to violence. He puts forth the logic 
that since violence is the instrument used 
by the colonizer to destroy the society of 
its colonial subjects, then for the colonized 
to stand on their own psychological feet, 
vis-a-vis the colonizer, they must not only 
slough off the yoke of inferiority and fear, 
but must also seize control of the colonial 
state apparatus used against them. They 
must also take advantage of the psychic 
dividends derived from their investment 
in violence during the colonial struggle 
against the enemy. 
In discussing the relevance of Fanon's 
theory of violence to present day Africa, I 
would like to argue that the historical rec-
ord of the African states do not by any 
means fulfill Fanon's dream. Indeed, so 
dissimilar were the actual processes of 
decolonization from what Fanon has 
painted as desirable in his book, The 
Wretched of the Earth , that Professor 
Aristide Zolberg could write: 
The discrepancy between this state-
ment and the actual historical record in 
Africa provides a clue to the tone of the 
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entire work. It is not concerned with 
providing an empirical description or a 
sociological explanation of political 
phenomena, but with shaping reality in 
accordance with "historical necessity" 
before it is too late. 3 
That the historical record does not 
correspond with the aspirations ex-
pressed in Fanon's writings does not nec-
essarily destroy the validity of his thesis. 
Zolberg himself recognizes this fact when 
he says that for Fanon "decolonization is 
not the establishment of a new state or the 
achievement of sovereignty but the re-
placement of one species of men by an-
other species of men." 4 It is this last 
statement that explains the Fanonian posi-
tion. Violence, according to Fanon, is the 
tool with which the colonized people 
could kill two birds with one stone.5 They 
could employ it to rid themselves of the 
colonialists who had imposed themselves 
willy-nilly on the co lonized society; they 
could also use it to purify themselves from 
the virus of colonial alienation. 
Actually, there is a paradox in Fanon's 
theory of violence and I tend to believe 
that this paradox is the root cause of the 
confusion about Fanon. The paradox, as I 
see it, is that Fanon knows very well that 
the violence of the colonizer served two 
main purposes: first, it provided the colo-
nizer with the opportunity to thingify the 
others; second, it degraded the van-
quished and his society by placing him 
and his society in the position of objects 
to be used, exploited and thingified. 
On the other hand, Fanon finds that 
when the table is turned against the colo-
nizer, violence works miracles for the 
colonized . It does not only dethrone the 
self-deified man, but it also brings about 
a revelation. This revelation is the knowl-
edge that vio lence and its agents are not 
the respectors of self-styled men-gods. In-
deed, the mere fact that the inferiorized 
man could spill the blood of members 
of this community of self-deified men 
means that the common denominator he 
shares with these colon izers is their mu-
tual mortality. 
This understanding of Fanon sheds -
quate light on the psychological si 
cance he attaches to violence. Fal)G('" 
cognizant of the psycho-therapeutic -
ture of violence and forth is reason he _ 
Violence alone, violence, committee_ 
the people, violence organized 
educated by its leaders, makes it 
sible for the masses to understand~­
cial truths and gives the key to them . .: 
When this statement is related to deo..~­
opments in Africa, we find that indepe-::-
ent African states did not resort to vio l 
to win their freedom from Europe. 
Algeria among the African indepe 
states travelled along the path of re 
tionaryviolence. Yet, if one is to accep<-.=c 
contention of Professor L. Adele Jina=_ 
one would have to agree that "there is 
indication that the FLN (Algeria's re 
tionary party) had a better bargai · _ 
position at Evian than, say, the Nigeric.. 
or Kenyans, or Ghanaians, (then the 
Coast) in London." 7 
Though Jinadu himself concedes -
fact that without violence Charles =>=-
Gau I le might not have re-entered ::-=-
French political scene again, his arg -
ment sti ll remains convinc ing. Algeria --
attained independence by following-= 
course of violence, but the language 
violence learned by the Algerian re 
tionaries-particularly the peasan .-
has not wrought that miracle which F~ 
expected to take place. B. Marie Per. -
baum, in an article , "Fanon and the R 
lutionary Peasantry," writes: 
With few notable exceptions-mosr 
which come from the autogest · 
sector-the post independence ree=-
tions of the peasants have been l 
than revolutionary. The war-time · __ 
fence so skillfully directed into rev 
tionary channels has given way to -= 
pressures of daily routines. War-ti = 
ideological indoctrination may ti --
porarily have transformed peasa;-
into 'leaping wolves' and 'rising g 
of wind', but did not inoculate 
against the other side of the peas;:;;-
3
Nyang: Fanon and the African Revolution: A Critical Study
Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
CJa.radox, the fruitless inertia and rural 
'.Jbscuratism Fanon feared.8 
This obseNation reveals the other side 
of the paradox of the Fanonian theory of 
violence, and indeed it is this aspect of his 
ought that exposes him to very telling 
lows from his critics. 
The point which Fanon's critics have 
-epeated over and over again is the fact 
at Fanon naively assumes that violence 
- the golden road to true liberation, and 
-;iat once violence is properly uti Ii zed in 
name of the revolution, al I of its partici-
::ants would continue to live up to the 
:teals of the revolution even after the new 
~le is established. 
To Fanon, violence has a cleansing 
" eel , because it "frees the native of his 
-"eriority complex and from his despair 
31d inaction; it makes him fearless and re-
res his self-respect." 9 Again , violence 
~ es as a soc ial adhesive because, as 
~...non argues, such a violence "consti-
- -es their only work, invests their charac-
with positive and creative quali-
-as." 10 In relating this idea of Fanon to 
- - ·ca, I can say that his notion of indi-
al violence as a cleansing act has not 
een concretized . Most of his commenta-
::; have not been impressed by it. Even 
- Algerians express some reseNations. 
analyzing the relevance of this aspect 
-= =anon's thought to Africa, one needs to 
mber that in the newly independent 
- - · an states, the type of vio le nee that is 
mon is far from Fanonist in quality. 
ps and rebellions have been reported 
ica, but no Fanonist type of violence 
emerged yet. There are at present 
_ ~ i lia movements in the settler states, 
- all the evidence available seems to 
est that in some of these groups, 
- ic ity, regionalism and petty rivalry 
- ~ to a certain extent eroded the faun-
s of national unity which Fanon as-
ja.ted with the use of violence. 
- ;nilcar Cabral , while accepting the 
- ing character of the armed struggle 
- st the Portuguese colonial enemy, 
felt that violence by itself could do 
,__ _______ _ _ _ __  - -
the trick in situations of national rivalry. 
Like the Vietnamese Nguyen Nghe, 
Cabral places emphasis on political edu-
cation and national development. During 
an address before a group of revolu-
tionary peasants, the late revolutionary 
said: 
The armed struggle is very important. 
But the most important is to have an 
understanding of the conditions of our 
people. Our people support armed 
struggle. We must give them the cer-
tainty that those who have arms in their 
hands are the sons of the people and 
that arms have no superiority over work-
ing tools. If one carries a rifle and the 
other a tool, the most important of the 
two is he who carries a tool. For one 
takes up arms to defeat the Portuguese, 
but if we want to chase out the Portu-
guese, it is to defend those who use 
toolsn 
Cabral 's statement touches an impor-
tant aspect of the paradox of the Fan on ian 
theory of violence. After the colonized 
have liberated themselves, what then are 
they going to do with the techniques of 
violence they have acquired over the 
years? In response to this question Cabral 
and Nghe would suggest that without 
proper political education , nothing con-
crete and revolutionary would take place. 
Guy Martin-Kane of Indiana University, 
in an article, "Fanon on Violence and the 
Revolutionary Process of Africa," has tried 
to defend Fanon by suggesting that to 
Fanon violence is not only for the liquida-
tion of the enemy, but for the repossession 
and acquisition of land and bread.12 
This claim is obvious to most of Fanon's 
commentators, but what is confounding is 
the fact that Fanon's theory of violence 
suffers from political cretinism - meaning 
Fanon did not develop and tie this idea to 
a broader and more comprehens ive theory 
of past colonial national development. It 
is indeed this political retardation or over-
sight on the part of Fanon that led Paul 
Beckett to write: "Fanon contributes 
virtually nothing to a solution of the prob- 23 
lem of creating and maintaining a popular 
and socialist state organization." 13 
Fanon thought that the armed struggle 
would set the stage for the newly liberated 
men to play their revolutionary role· in the 
human historical drama. But what he failed 
to realize was the fact that violence is a 
drug that could either kill its user or put 
him temporarily in a state of revolutionary 
ecstasy, and that once its hangover ef-
fects are gone, the user is willy-nilly 
forced by the concatenation of circum-
stances to face the reality of economic 
deprivation once again. 
In an African World that is divided into 
states and whose leaders have deceived 
or convinced themselves that they are 
really independent, any appeal to vio-
lence as the royal road to liberation is 
bound to face serious opposition. 
Fanon writes articulately about the 
African bourgeoisie that seized power 
with the departure of the ex-colonialists. 
He knows how corrupt and inconsiderate 
they are. He also notes their arrogance. 
But the appl ication of Fanon's theory of 
violence is not the issue here. The point in 
dispute is the applicability and the neces-
sity of such an approach to liberation. To 
this question, Aristide Zolberg gives an 
answer. The veteran American Africanist, 
reflecting upon the hope of the African 
revolution , writes: 
Rulers will change, their rhetoric will 
differ, their emissaries will travel to other 
capitals . At home, however, the most 
likely outcome will be "more of the 
same": a regime with flimsy structures 
of authority, ill-equipped to cope with 
the immense task of modernization, hid-
ing beneath a ritualistic authoritarian 
facade, and devoting much of its skimpy 
resources to the maintenance of an 
oligarchy. Perhaps new spokesmen are 
coming who will invoke Fanon as the 
prophet of the second revolution. 14 
Since the picture which is painted 
above has already been prophesied by 
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"the prophet of the Second Revolution " 
and is being fulfilled in many of the Third 
World countries, can we expect a band of 
believers of the kingdom of Fanonian 
I iberation to launch their struggle in the 
manner of all political movements that 
have ever wished to change the world? 
The answer to this question cannot be 
given here. It wi II , however, be attempted 
in the next section where Fanon's theory 
of the revolutionary peasantry will be the 
main focus. 
The other important point is: Fanon's 
theory of violence assumes that the revo-
lutionary cadre would emerge out of the 
intellectual class. The theory also entrusts 
the important task of political education to 
the " illegalist intellectuals" who are will-
ing to abandon their collaborationist col-
leagues in the urban areas and move out 
to the countryside where they would join 
forces with the rural masses. 
It can be said, briefly and in passing , 
the new African leaders are so latched on 
to their newly acquired powers that one 
wonders whether political matrimony is 
the newest African innovation over the 
traditional form of polygamy. This phe-
nomenon, which I describe as "political 
monogamy," is generally characterized 
by the intense jealousy of African pol iti-
cians towards their ministerial portfolios. 
Each minister seems to take his newly ac-
quired power as a bride from the political 
kingdom which Nkrumah advised them to 
seek. 
In light of these recent developments in 
African politics, I would argue that Fanon's 
theory of violence would be logical for 
those who share his view that decoloni-
zation is incomplete so long as the peas-
antry is not bui I ding the foundations of the 
new society, where their interests will not 
be at the mercy of a corrupt and uncon-
cerned bourgeoisie. For those who are 
more realistic about the facts of African 
life and politics, the chances for a Fano-
nian revolutionary use of violence is far-
fetched, not because the idea is absurd 
and impractical, but because of the un-
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availability of Fanonian missionaries who 
are ready to take the doctrines of the de-
ceased prophet to the chosen people. 
II. The Revolutionary Peasantry. 
The most important contribution of Fanon 
to political thought in the new Africa is his 
theory of a revolutionary peasantry. In his 
view, this body of men constitutes the 
chosen people who certainly have a ren-
dezvous with the national destiny. This 
national destiny is the state of affairs 
whereby psycho-political and psycho-
social balances are observable, not only 
in the ideas and thought patterns of the 
members of the emerging nations, but 
also in the activities undertaken within 
this newly established nation. 
In I ight of the above statements, one 
question comes to mind: Why does Fanon 
sing le out the peasantry for th is important 
historical role? The answer is provided in 
his The Wretched of the Earth , where 
Fanon argues that within the colonial so-
ciety the peasantry is at the bottom of the 
pecking order and is the most exploited . 
On top of this externally superimposed 
social /economic hierarchy, Fanon tel ls us, 
is the African bourgeoisie. 
Next to this smal I fraction of the African 
population is the working class, followed 
by the lumpen-proletariat This last social 
category consists of those landless peas-
ants who have found their way to the urban 
centers of the colonizer. 
Fanon implicitly compares this group to 
both the African middle class of the towns 
and the peasantry in the fol lowing 
passage: 
The landless peasants , who make up the 
lumpen-proletariat, leave the country 
districts , where vital statistics are just so 
many insoluble problems, rush toward 
the towns, crowd into the tinshack set-
tlements , and try to make their way into 
the ports and cities founded by colonial 
domination. The bulk of the country peo-
ple for their part continue to live within 
a rigid framework, and the extra mouths 
to feed have no other alternative than 
to emigrate toward the centers -
population. 15 _ 
In the passages following the one c··=-
above, Fanon idealizes the African peEE-
antry as the defender of traditions. In le::;. 
to use his own words, "the peasantry --:::. 
colonized society stands for the di -
plined element whose interests lie 
maintaining the social structure." 16 
Though Fanon is realistic enough ~ 
recognize the dangers of a mumified::::. 
dition, his analysis suggests that -:::. 
peasants could be disciplined and a - __ 
istic in their spontaneous movements. TI 
Fanonian faith in the revolutionary pote--
tials of the peasantry is part of his gen =.. 
belief in the role of a chosen pea =. 
Though many commentators and revi 
ers have attacked him on this issue, se-
eral of these works are either too pol1:r-
ical or too unpersuasive to be accepted_ 
A close look at the train of events 
Africa during the post World War II pe -
reveals that the African peasantry 
been used for electoral purposes ra 
than for violent overthrow of colonial 
gimes. In Ghana, under Nkrumah, 
Convention Peoples Party proved to 
more successful than its rivals simply 00-
cause Nkrumah took his campaigns to • -
rural folks . It was this clever technique -
electioneering that gave him the suppo-
of both the so-cal led "Verandah boys" re= 
Ghana's big towns and cities and the rurE 
voters in the countryside.17 
The Ghanaian record does not sh<:Ji 
Nkrumah as an organizer of the Africa.-
peasantry for a violent overthrow of Britist 
colonialism. What really took place -
Ghana was the attempt by young poli -
cians to seize power from older and more 
conservative leaders. In fact, when one 
talks about Ghana's evolution to ind&-
pendence, one can maintain that Nkru-
mah's positive action was more constitu-
tional ly accommodation ist than blantantl} 
violent 
In the pre-independence era, Nkruma; 
was more Ghandian and more accom~ 
dative; in the post colonial period , 
5
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came to see the pitfalls of neo-colonialism 
of which Fanon writes so eloquently. 
At the second stage of his ideological 
development, Nkrumah revised his pre-
vious position on a united front of all 
Ghanaians in the name of national unity 
and developed a class analysis of African 
society. The following statement sums up 
his post-1966 position : 
Class divisions in modern African so-
ciety became blurred to some extent 
during the pre-independence period, 
when it seemed there was national unity 
and all classes joined forces to eject 
the colonial power. This led some to 
proclaim that there were no class divi-
sions in Africa and that communalism 
and egalitarianism of traditional African 
society made any notion of a class 
struggle out of the question. But the 
exposure of this fallacy followed quickly 
after independence, when class cleav-
ages which had been temporarily sub-
merged in the struggle to win political 
freedom reappeared, often with in-
creased intensity, particularly in those 
places where the newly independent 
government embarked on socialist pol-
icies.18 
When compared to the Fanonian formu-
tion , this second position of Nkrumah is 
- ·gnificant 011 two grounds. First, prior to 
·s death, Nkrumah came to share the Fan-
ian contention that the national bour-
:;;eoisie is bent on feeding parasitically on 
e labors of the downtrodden of African 
::oc iety. Like Fanon, he again came to the 
"38.I ization that: 
Unlike the bourgeoisie of developed 
countries, which may be termed a busi-
ness bourgeoisie, the African bourgeoi-
sie is mainly bureaucratic and profes-
sional. It is in general not engaged in 
production, nor does it control produc-
tion. For its suNival it depends on pro-
ducers, and their production is con-
trolled by imperialism. 19 
The second point about Nkrumah 's post 
- 366 position . is that though he shares 
Fanon's view of the national bourgeoisie, 
he still persists in his Marxian belief that 
the African revolution has an important 
role for the proletariat. It is here that the 
two African theoreticians part company. 
Nkrumah's chart on page 11 of his Class 
Struggle in Africa classifies the .African 
peasantry as one of the partners of the 
workers in their collective oppression , but 
he refuses to take the bold Fanonian stand 
that the African revolution is to be carried 
out by the peasantry. 
When one looks at other African coun-
tries one easily notices that the peasantry 
has not yet lived up to the prophet's ex-
pectations. The record seems to suggest 
that the national bourgeoisie for whom 
Fanon reserves only bitter and harsh 
words are still using this same peasantry 
for their own good. In some areas, Fanon's 
warning that tribalism or regionalism 
would be used to divide the peasantry 
seemed to have been vindicated ; in 
others, the mass parties that emerged to 
forge a multiethnic foundation for the 
emerging state proved to be_in the post-
colonial era a neo-colonial Trojan horse 
that was presented to the countryside by 
the urban politicians and their rural coun-
terparts. Such a Trojan horse is, however, 
very dangerous for it is manufacturered 
by international capital. 
Reading through the massive collection 
of articles, books and monographs, one 
finds that Fanon's understanding of the 
African peasantry is more emotional than 
systematic and scientific. As some Afri-
canists have pointed out in their publica-
tions, the African peasantry varies in 
membership from region to region. This 
understanding is lacking in Fanon, and 
when we talk about the historical record 
on African politics, it becomes very clear 
to most of us that the Fanon ian hope of 
spontaneous peasant revolution is more 
normatively prescriptive than historical. 
The turn of events in Africa since 1961 
definitely proved Fanon all wrong , and 
there are certainly reasons for such a 
rapid evaporation of the Fanonian hope. 
The national bourgeoisie did not share 25 
the Fanonian vision of the peasantry. To 
the bourgeois leaders, the peasantry has 
been a tool to forge electoral victories 
rather than an instrument to dismantle the 
colonial apparatus in the name of national 
development. 
In a world dominated by men who are 
armed with science and technology, 
Fanon fails to see that the peasants can 
only be led to action after a long period of 
political education. He did read the hand-
writing on the colonial wall , and missed 
the fact that the peasants were already 
sold to the neocolonial regime. This point 
is crucial. Since the independence of 
Ghana, not a single African state has at-
tained freedom without a leadership that 
is part of the collaborative bourgeoisie. 
Even the Algeria for which Fanon did so 
much has not escaped this phenomenon 
completely. 
The African revolution , under peasant 
leadership, will come about only when 
peasants have developed a higher degree 
of consciousness of their individual as 
well as collective deprivation and exploi-
tation. This, however, is not likely to hap-
pen without help from the outside. Fanon 
himself is very much aware of this fact. In 
fact, he recommends the political instruc-
tion of the peasantry by what he calls the 
"i llegalist militants" from the urban cen-
ters. This group of political mentors must 
be men of ideas, commitment and zea l. 
They are of course the intellectuals whom 
Fanon has ceaselessly pleaded for help 
in the painful transformation of colonial 
society. 
In analyzing the prospects of a Fanonian 
revolution, therefore, let us outline the 
major factors that are likely to promote or 
inhibit the Fanonian cause. First of all , in 
addition to a heightened sense of peasant 
consciousness, there must develop a 
body of illegalist intellectuals who are 
ready to organize the peasants for the 
"new beginning" which decolonization 
was expected to initiate. Such a body 
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26 could be effective only if its members are 
dedicated guerrilla missionaries who 
share the Fanonian vision. Without such 
fanatical enthusiasm and faith , these men 
may "use Fanon's arguments as temporary 
accouterments in their effort to break into 
the developing establishments." 20 
The record of the last decade has shown 
that many African students from European 
and American universities have toned 
down their mil itancy and joined the ranks 
of the ruling caste which , in Fanon's view, 
is "preoccupied with filling its pockets as 
rapidly as possible." 21 Such an oppor-
tunistic turnabout is sacrilegious in the 
Fanonian gospel , and no sober observer 
of the African scene should discount its 
frequency among aspiring young Afri-
cans.22 
Another point that is worthy of attention 
is the fact that a Fanonian type revolution 
cannot be accomplished easily in the post 
colonial era. The reason for this is quite 
simp le: the new caste that Fanon attacks 
so severely does not only come from the 
same African background as the " illegal-
ist intellectuals" who are supposed to 
challenge them, but they also know more 
than their departed colonial mentors about 
the very weaknesses of their people. This 
knowledge is often used in a very destruc-
tive and opportunistic manner, and the 
i I legal ist who wishes to organize the peas-
antry against such an African bourgeois 
caste must recogn ize these limitations. 
Another point which is crucial to any 
discussion on the possible role of the 
peasantry in a Fanonian revolution in 
Africa is the fact that Fanonian guerri I la 
missionaries would have to revise some 
of their positions on the role of the prole-
tariat and national bourgeoisie. It is true 
that their prophet debunks the possible 
role of the proletariat in a revolutionary 
armed struggle; but at the same time, it 
must be noted that the peasantry would 
be able to confront the challenges and 
hazards of a technological and scientific 
world only with the help of all those social 
groups whose members are possessors 
of industrial skills and techniques. 
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Fanon's claim that the proletariat is a 
privileged member of the colonial system 
is a half-truth in the sense that. on one 
hand, this African proletariat receives a 
greater slice of the colonial cake than the 
peasantry, but on the other hand, suffers 
the same psychic injury of which Fanon 
himself writes. 
Fanon admonishes the peasant revolu-
tionaries and lumpen-proletariat counter-
parts to stand on their own feet economi-
cally, politically and ideologically. He 
warns them not to be without an ideology 
as other African states have been since 
independence. 
Fan on does not only recommend to his 
followers a political organization that 
bridges the gulf between town and coun-
try, but he also calls for a redistribution of 
wealth between the town and the country. 
He goes further by telling his followers not 
to beg abroad for foreign aid , but to press 
for reparations. This Fanonian teaching 
has been dismissed as a moral threat 
without any force behind it. But, in all fair-
ness to Fanon, such a simplistic dismissal 
of the Fanonian plea does a gross injus-
tice. Fanon 's plea is made in the light of 
recent world history. Germany's atrocities 
against the Jews of Europe was, as Aime 
Cesaire points out elsewhere, the appli-
cation of perfected European colonial 
techniques on a European minority. If the 
Jewish victims of Hitler were paid indem-
nities and reparations, why not the poor 
wretched of the earth who only need tech-
nology and capital to regain their dignity 
as free men and to make use of science 
and technology in their own countries? 
Ill. Conclusion 
In the preceding paragraphs I have tried 
to c larify the issues concerning the rele-
vance of Fanonian teaching to the post-
independent era in Africa. I have shown 
that Fanon 's conception of violence is 
paradoxical and that those who wish to 
follow his gospel must be prepared to 
deal with the consequences of his call for 
violence. In concluding this analysis, I 
would argue that the available evidence 
at present does not suggest any no<=..,. 
attempt to use violent means for 
pose of forming a new nation in the =?-
onian tradition. 
The kind of violence that seems - -
pervasive in African societies today i 
which flows from the barrels of g 
African army officers, settlers, and ---
can guerrillas. The former's bullets~ - - -
rected against rival army officers anc 
rupt or ineffective politicians; the 1~ 
are aimed at colonial settlers who 
to recognize the simple democratic~ -
ciple of majority rule. 
Fanon's emphasis on the peasan· . 
both realistic and naive simultan 
It is realistic in the sense that for Afri 
to regain their humanity they must s 
time, money and intellectual energy 
the political education and economic __ 
liftment of their rural people. If the 
man remains in his "cave" or "med· ==-
world ," such a state of affairs could 
become an affront to the African peasar.;;-
Fanon is correct in saying Africans CG""-
not take their rightful place in the h 
drama ifthe overwhelming majority of 
people are languishing in the chains -
peasant poverty, ignorance and hungzr 
However, he was naive in believing 
the African bourgeoisie would aban 
its position of privilege in the name -
national interest. To expect an underdeve-
oped bourgeoisie to forfeit its privileg= 
voluntarily is to exaggerate the goodnes.::: 
of an advantaged human creature. 
But Fanon's naivete was not very seve 
for though he calls upon the African b 
geoisie to use their acquired intellectuE 
and technical skills and resources for ttlG 
betterment of their less fortunate brothe 
he recognizes their greed and fran · 
frenzy to maximize their easy gains at the 
expense of their rustic and illitera 
brethren. 
Related to the above is the point tha;: 
Fanonian revolutionaries in the future mu 
be able to differentiate between those 
profiteers who ride on political and bu-
reaucratic horses and those who try to 
maximize profits by being middlemen for 
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ernational capital. Such a differentiation 
·11 be necessary if the Fanonian revolu-
- aries are to deal effectively with these 
- emies against whom their master has 
warned them. 
The last point of importance is: Though 
=anon's dreams have yet to be fulfilled in 
ir totality, many of his prophecies have 
:nne to pass. He has warned about one-
::arty states and the evidence of the last 
.:ecade seems to vindicate him. He has 
onished the African people about the 
sibility of military coups, and today 
presence of 18 military governments 
the continent proves him correct. He 
as said watch out against political lead-
who talked about independence and 
tice during the colonial period and 
descred it themselves by their blatant 
:oocrisy. 
e historical record certainly bears 
imony to the accuracy of his words and 
- - now clear that the fathers of African 
·ons are shamelessly millionaires when 
- lions of their fellow countrymen are 
~ ely making a living. 
r=anon has also taught the lesson that 
e of us would worship the idols of 
:.:Jalism and regionalism, and the set of 
on African political developments 
to prove him correct as a prophet of 
African revolution. 
ese prophetic remarks of Fanon put 
in a special place in African intellec-
-:z. history and for this reason I think his 
·ngs will continue to capture the atten-
of reviewers, commentators and 
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